Founded in 2010, Worldreader was an international nonprofit organization that promoted reading to children around the world. For many years, Worldreader distributed e-readers to under-resourced communities and funded its operations primarily through philanthropic donations. In 2019, Worldreader launched the BookSmart mobile reading application, and soon thereafter came the idea of a new, self-perpetuating funding structure: the “flywheel.” Worldreader began charging schools and community-based organizations a $6 monthly subscription fee per child to use BookSmart, with the goal of using earned revenue to sustain operational costs and philanthropy to cover other strategic priorities. However, Worldreader soon realized that ability to pay varied greatly among potential “customers,” leading to several exceptions to the initial price. The team also worried that the subscription disincentivized scale and conflicted with Worldreader’s ultimate goal of impacting millions of children. As Co-Founder and CEO David Risher and his team prepared for an upcoming meeting with UNICEF, which typically sought fixed-price contracts, they considered whether a price per-child, per-month would be acceptable. More broadly, they considered whether they had landed on the optimal price point and funding strategy – and the potential implications of pursuing earned revenue on Worldreader’s ability to bid for international development grants.

In July 2021, Sunil Lalvani, founder and CEO of Project Maji, a non-profit social enterprise headquartered in Dubai that had already provided sustainable, clean water solutions to 80,000 people living in rural communities across Ghana and Kenya, was facing an important decision. Traditionally, fees collected from community members covered the operating and maintenance costs of the solar-powered water kiosks, while donations paid the initial capital expenditure and setup costs. Yet Lalvani needed a more scalable financing solution to reach a hefty goal: impacting 1 million lives by 2025. Serving larger, more affluent peri-urban communities was a viable alternative, as the additional revenue could be channeled to rural projects. Thus, Lalvani and his team worked on a pilot for three peri-urban sites and looked to Danone Communities, a venture capital fund that invested in social businesses, to provide a loan. The team mapped out a feasible system, but debated what fees to charge residents. A low price meant that Project Maji would pay off the loan for the first four years, and only then start accumulating funds to support its activities in rural areas. This would delay scaling. Alternatively, a high price, coupled with an offer to establish direct connections in more well-off households, would allow Project Maji to generate excess earned revenue from the get-go, but it would also raise questions of equitability. All of this weighed on Lalvani as he pondered what price point to include in the investment proposal.

In 2021, Nick Woodman, founder and CEO of GoPro, was reviewing the company’s subscription offering, considering whether to extend it beyond benefits that are directly related to the company’s iconic camera. Founded in 2002, GoPro had gained renown for its innovative action camera. The brand became synonymous with living an active lifestyle and attracted a strong following on social media. GoPro was a Wall Street favorite when it went public in 2014 at $24 per share, rising to over $90 per share later that year. But just four years later the stock price had slid to $6 per share due to stagnating demand, inventory management issues, bloated expenses, and problems with new product launches. During the COVID-related retail slowdown in 2020, GoPro increased its direct-to-consumer footprint and aggressively marketed a new subscription. The stock price rebounded, in part due to investors placing a higher multiple on the predictable, recurring revenue generated by subscriptions. By 2021, however, subscription benefits were still largely tied to camera ownership. Woodman was considering whether GoPro could leverage its position as an active lifestyle brand to extend the subscription to benefits beyond the camera itself, similar to the way Amazon packed a host of benefits into Amazon Prime. Woodman saw enormous potential for GoPro’s subscription and believed that, someday, it could even become the company’s new flagship “product.” But how much license did the brand have to grow beyond digital cameras and image capture? What pricing options could the company explore for a bigger, better subscription? In concert with these decisions, should GoPro look to shift even more of its business away from retailers to direct sales?

NiPay, a software provider competing in the Nigerian business-to-business payments market, sells an online transactions solution and a mobile transactions solution to retailers and other merchants. On the back of recent market research, the company’s founder Idaku Ibrahim is looking to set optimal prices for these products across four distinct customer segments. Complicating matters is the fact that the preferences of one segment are changing, and that the research agency sees an opportunity to sell “bulk” orders of a stripped-down online payments product to a range of intermediaries.

This case describes the actions taken by British Telecom’s business unit (BT Business) in response to the radical ‘free broadband forever’ offer introduced by The Carphone Warehouse (TCW) in April 2006. At the time of the campaign, BT Business held a dominant share of the lucrative (and fast growing) broadband market in the UK. TCW’s bold move clearly threatened that position. More important, BT Business was concerned that larger competitors (Vodafone, BSkyB, O2, etc) would follow suit, therefore initiating a price war that in all likelihood would erase profitability in the industry. The main learning points from this case involve pricing and competitive strategy. In particular, BT Business’ problem touches on a number of important questions, including: (1) maintaining price leadership; (2) managing price competition and the threat of customisation; and (3) designing product bundles that capture customer value and act to discourage competition. In addition, this case provides a good example of the challenges often faced by large firms (especially former monopolies) attempting to improve customer orientation. Prior to ‘free broadband forever’, BT had tried unsuccessfully on a number of occasions to shift its organisational structure away from product lines (fixed telephony, mobile voice and data, broadband, etc). Interestingly, they succeeded only in the face of a significant and immediate competitive that ‘helped’ generate the necessary motivation and momentum.

This is two-case series discusses some of the key marketing decisions faced by Eric Baker and the rest of his management team immediately before and after the launch of viagogo in the United Kingdom and other European markets. viagogo is an on-line marketplace where sellers and buyers can exchange live event tickets (sports, entertainment, etc) in a legal and secure manner. The underlying business model replicated the one introduced by StubHub in the United States, a company founded by Eric Baker and a fellow Stanford MBA a few years earlier. The first part of the case is set in June 2006, just two months before the official launch of the website. At that time, the case protagonists faced important decisions with respect to the company’s revenue model. In particular, they had to determine what level of commission to charge, how to split this commission across sellers and buyers, and what pricing mechanism(s) to use (ie, fixed price, auction, and / or declining price). Eric was also considering a potential partnership with a major football club in the UK. A deal was expected to generate considerable exposure for viagogo but, on the other hand, required significant investment and likely constrained the company’s promotional options. The second part of the case takes place in early 2008. Following a brief review of viagogo’s initial performance, a series of new challenges are introduced: (1) how to deal with increasing competition; (2) how to improve the general perception of secondary ticketing in the marketplace; and (3) how to scale the business up from start-up to middle-sized enterprise. Overall, the case highlights common challenges when launching a new business venture. It also questions the common belief that a successful business model in one country can be easily replicated in another. Finally, the case allows for a discussion of how business models tend to change as industries ‘mature’ and new opportunities arise.